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JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW
WRITING COMPETITION WINNER
THE NEED FOR A MANDATORY AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR PREVAILING
PLAINTIFFS IN ERISA BENEFITS
CASES*
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) was
passed "to protect interstate commerce, the Federal taxing power, and the
interests of participants in private pension plans and their beneficiaries." 2 In
particular, the intent to protect plan participants is evident from the statute's
explicit duties for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans and the requirement
for "appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal
Courts.",3 The Department of Labor (DOL) and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS), as well as private litigants, share enforcement of the rights
guaranteed under ERISA.4 Significantly, section 502(g)(1) of ERISA em-
phasizes the role of the private litigant because courts may award reasonable
attorney's fees to either party in benefits cases. 5
Fee-shifting, where one party bears the expense of the other party's legal
fees, arose out of the general American rule that each party should bear its
own litigation costs.6 Today, parties pay their own fees unless a statute au-
thorizes fee-shifting, a party litigates unfairly or, sometimes, where a plaintiff
successfully brings a suit on behalf of a class.7 Such fee-shifting was pro-
vided in section 502(g)(1) of ERISA to make the federal courts accessible to
* First Place, John H. Fanning Labor Law Writing Competition, Columbus School of
Law, The Catholic University of America, 1992.
1. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988)
and in scattered sections of the I.R.C.).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (1988).
3. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978) (citing ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 1001(b)).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (1988).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Specifically, this section states that "the court in its discretion
may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party." Id.
6. See Peter N. Cubita et al., Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 277, 278 (1982) (discussing the American Rule, its origin and its
application).
7. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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participants of modest means.' Ideally, when a plaintiff prevails in an ER-
ISA action for denial of benefits, the plaintiff should be made whole for the
injury caused by denial of benefits.9 However, in reality, the statute fails to
address the plaintiff's costs in enforcing his rights under ERISA.' ° The
award of attorney's fees in ERISA cases is not mandatory.1 1 Rather than
providing a truly "make whole" remedy, the statue gives the courts wide
discretion to determine what amount of fees, if any, are reasonable.
12
Most courts have adopted a five-prong test developed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Eaves v. Penn 13 to decide attor-
ney's fees awards."' Alternatively, courts have employed standards for
awarding attorney's fees set forth in other federal statutes. 5 By leaving the
question of attorney's fees up to the court's discretion, Congress has fostered
an unpredictable and inconsistent standard that produces difficulties for
plaintiffs who are trying to vindicate rights created by ERISA. 6 Specifi-
cally, the discretion to award reasonable fees in ERISA benefits cases fails to
protect plaintiffs and additionally fails to provide sufficient incentive for at-
8. See Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589-90 (9th Cir. 1984) (ap-
pealing a court order denying attorney's fees to a plaintiff who was entitled to such fees under a
settlement agreement in an action under ERISA). Without such a provision, potential litigants
of modest means would be unable to afford the costs to litigate their rights under ERISA.
9. Unlike benefits cases, in fiduciary violation cases the prevailing plaintiff is made
whole. See, e.g., GIW Indus. v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton & Jacobsen, Inc., 10 Employee Bene-
fits Cas. (BNA) 2290, 2305 (S.D. Ga. 1989) (holding that an investment management firm that
breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA was required to restore trust beneficiaries to the
position they would have occupied but for the breach), aff'd, 895 F.2d 729 (11 th Cir. 1990);
Whitfield v. Tomasso, 682 F. Supp. 1287, 1305 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that the trustee of a
fund who engaged in a prohibited transaction under ERISA was required to make the fund
whole for losses sustained pursuant to § 409); Gilliam v. Edwards, 492 F. Supp. 1255, 1266
(D.N.J. 1980) (holding that the trustee of a pension fund who violated his duty of individual
loyalty was required to make the plan whole).
ERISA grants courts wide discretion in fashioning legal and equitable relief to make plans
whole and to protect the rights of beneficiaries. Punitive damages, however, are not available
under ERISA. See, e.g., McRae v. Seafarers' Welfare Plan, 920 F.2d 819, 821 (1 1th Cir. 1991)
(reversing an award of extracontractual damages in a benefits denial case where plaintiff pre-
vailed, but upholding the award of attorneys fees); American Communications Ass'n v. Retire-
ment Plan for Employees of RCA Corp., 507 F. Supp. 922, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (awarding
defendants in an ERISA suit fees and costs to be paid by union based on capacity of union to
pay fees).
10. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1988).
11. Id.
12. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
13. 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978).
14. See infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)
[hereinafter Fees Award Act]; Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (1988) [hereinafter ADEA]; Equal Access to Justice Act, § 201, 28 U.S.C. § 2412
(d)(1)(A) (1988) [hereinafter EAJA].
16. See cases cited infra note 67.
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torney's to take such cases.' 7 Given the modest means of most plan partici-
pants, the need for mandatory award of attorney's fees to prevailing
plaintiffs is critical. In addition, the failure of the ERISA drafters to include
a mandatory fee award for prevailing plaintiffs deters plaintiff's attorneys
from becoming knowledgeable about ERISA law and taking on such cases. 
18
Therefore, the unpredictability of attorney's fees awards in the federal
courts19 has essentially precluded most participants from bringing a benefits
claim under section 502(g)(1). Moreover, ERISA's administrative proce-
dures present a further impediment to benefits claims.
In order to bring an action under ERISA, a participant must first exhaust
all administrative remedies available under the plan. 20 After a participant or
17. See American Association of Retired Persons, Statement Before the Work Group on
Enforcement of the Advisory Council on Employee Welfare and Pension Benefit Plans of the
U.S. Department of Labor, Aug. 20, 1990 at 4 [hereinafter AARP Statement]:
Individuals often.., face an insurmountable problem. Plaintiff's attorneys are reluc-
tant to take such cases-the work is complex and there is little return for the effort.
Those with small claims have little chance of finding professional assistance. Those
with large claims, upon presenting a difficult case to an underdeveloped plaintiffs'
bar, also often find a closed door. In essence, the individual is effectively denied
access to a system that is intended to be largely self-enforcing.
Id.
18. Proposals to Strengthen ERISA Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor
of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter 1990 ERISA Hearings] (statement of Jeffrey Lewis of the National Employment Lawyers
Ass'n (NELA):
Even the relatively small number of NELA member attorneys who take plaintiffs'
ERISA cases are reluctant to take these individual benefit claims cases to court....
[T]here is a good chance that no attorneys fees will be awarded by the court even if
the case is won ....
Id.
NELA "is a nonprofit organization of over 850 lawyers in 40 chapters in 49 states." Id. at
1. The group acts as advocates for employee rights. "[M]embers concentrate on the represen-
tation of individual employees in employment, labor and discrimination matters. [Almost] all
[the] members encounter ERISA ... in, their practices, and some ... members specialize in
representing employee benefit plan participants under ERISA." Id. As a result, Mr. Lewis,
on behalf of NELA, is in a unique position to comment on the current status of both attorneys
who take, and those who refuse to take, ERISA cases. Id.
19. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
20. See Kross v. Western Elec. Co., 701 F.2d 1238, 1243-45 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
because ERISA contains no statutorily defined administrative remedies, all administrative
remedies specified within a plan must be exhausted before an action can be brought in federal
court). There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. Remedies do not have to be ex-
hausted where: 1) it would be futile to go through the administrative process, Amato v. Ber-
nard, 618 F.2d 559, 568 (9th Cir. 1980) (recognizing the futility exception where a plaintiff
brought suit against pension fund trustees for declaration of parties' rights and duties under
the trust plan and for money damages for trustees' bad faith dealings with plaintiff); 2) a
statutory right is involved, Lucas v. Warner & Swasey Co., 475 F. Supp. 1071, 1074 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (holding that where there is a showing of irreparable harm, which is either job-related or
will affect the exercise of rights under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act,
1992]
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beneficiary has exhausted the remedies available under the plan,2 ERISA
provides the right to go directly to federal court.2 2 Once in federal court, the
statute requires deference to the decision of the plan administrator unless
benefits were denied arbitrarily or the plan administrator violated his fiduci-
ary obligations under ERISA.23 Currently, although a prevailing plaintiff
may be awarded attorney's fees for representation during litigation, legal
costs incurred during pre-trial exhaustion of plan administrative remedies
are rarely included in these awards. 24 Furthermore, ERISA's legislative his-
tory is virtually silent concerning this fee-shifting provision. 25 All of these
factors mitigate against a participant enforcing his rights under ERISA.2 6
At present, there is no movement on the part of the DOL, the IRS, or Con-
gress to clarify this uncertainty.
27
there is no exhaustion requirement); 3) claimant is threatened with irreparable harm if he or
she resorts to administrative remedies, id.; 4) claimant is denied access to the plan's adminis-
trative procedures, Taylor v. Bakery & Confectionary Union & Indus. Int'l Welfare Fund, 455
F. Supp. 816, 820 (E.D.N.C. 1978) (holding that barring the presence of a valid exception, an
employee who brought action for denial of benefits was required to exhaust administrative
procedure); see also Wolf. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 728 F.2d 182, 185-86 (3d Cir.
1984) (requiring a widow, who prevailed in an ERISA action to recover benefits as the desig-
nated beneficiary of a deceased employee, to exhaust administrative remedies with regard to
claims only, and not with regard to all potential issues or theories).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988). ERISA does not specifically define administrative reme-
dies. Instead, the statute defines who may bring a federal civil action for certain relief. How-
ever, cases have held that all administrative remedies available under the particular plan must
be exhausted.
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). If the participant decides to bring action under ER-
ISA, state law is preempted and the action must be brought in federal court.
23. See, e.g., Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (holding that
deference only applies where the plan itself specifically grants the plan administrator(s) discre-
tion to award or deny benefits). Given the holding in Firestone, no plan would fail to contain
such a provision, because failure to do so would result in de novo review of an administrator's
decision.
24. Since one cannot bring a separate action for attorney's fees, such a policy discourages
plaintiffs and attorneys from remedying a problem at the administrative level. See Marilyn
Park, ERISA: Early Expert Evaluation: An Alternative Dispute Resolution Model for Pension
Benefit Claims (1991) (on file at Pension Rights Center) (explaining how the Model Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism would allow for fees to be awarded at the adminis-
trative level).
25. See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Retirement Plan for Employees of RCA
Corp., 507 F. Supp. 922, 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In American Communications, a prevailing
defendant filed for an award of attorney's fees against the plaintiff. Id. The court stated that
the legislative history of ERISA provided no guidelines or criteria for the court to determine
when it should invoke its discretion and award attorney's fees. Id.
26. See, e.g., Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984)
(referring to 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988) and holding that a court should apply its discretion
consistent with the purposes of ERISA to protect employee rights and to secure effective ac-
cess to the federal courts).
27. In comparison, Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to remedy the inconsistencies re-
garding fee awards that developed in civil rights cases after the Supreme Court's decision in
[Vol. 41:871
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This Comment first discusses the history of fee-shifting in the United
States. It then provides an overview of the sparse legislative history of ER-
ISA and the subsequent tests used by the circuits when awarding attorney's
fees in ERISA cases. Next, this Comment analyzes the circuit courts' inter-
pretation of ERISA's fee-shifting provision and the negative effects of the
current state of the law. This Comment then discusses the reasons that the
law continues to exist in its present state. Finally, this Comment concludes
that in order to fulfill the purpose of ERISA, the statute must be amended to
include a mandatory award of attorney's fees to plaintiffs who prevail at
trial. Only mandatory awards will protect plaintiffs' rights to bring legiti-
mate ERISA claims, encourage attorneys to accept these cases, and prompt
the development of expertise in dealing with the intricacies of ERISA
claims.
I. HISTORY
A. Legislative History of ERISA
The legislative history of ERISA fails to clarify the intent behind ERISA's
fee-shifting provision. 2 Most likely a fee-shifting provision was included in
ERISA to equalize the strengths of the parties and to provide plaintiffs of
modest means with sufficient incentive to enforce their rights under the stat-
ute.29 Because of the Congressional silence regarding fee-shifting, the
courts' decisions in ERISA cases draw on a variety of sources, including
other statutes, when justifying the award or denial of attorney's fees.30
Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam). See S. REP. No. 1011, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5912. [hereinafter 1976 SEN-
ATE REPORT]. The Supreme Court in Newman held that the prevailing party should ordina-
rily recover attorney's fees unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.
Under § 1988, a court, in its discretion, may award a prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
28. H.R. REP. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4639, 4655 [hereinafter 1973 HOUSE REPORT].
29. See also Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting.: A Critical
Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 664, 666.
30. See, e.g., Gray v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 258 (1st Cir. 1986)
(rejecting the Seventh Circuit's EAJA standard and instead using the five-factor test to deny
fees to defendant); Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir. 1984) (com-
paring the presumption in favor of a prevailing plaintiff under the Fees Awards Act to the five-
factor test and reversing an award of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants in an ERISA
case).
1992]
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B. Fee-Shifting Under the Common Law
Generally, litigants in American courts are expected to pay their own at-
torney's fees and costs of litigation.3 The leading Supreme Court case en-
forcing the "American Rule" is Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society.12
In Alyeska, the Wilderness Society and other environmental groups
brought an action to prevent the construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline.3
The Court of Appeals had awarded the groups' attorneys' fees based on the
theory that the groups were "performing the service of a 'private attorney
general.' ,3' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the American Rule
requires each party to pay the cost of its own legal representation. 5
The Alyeska Court reasoned that because only Congress, and not the
courts, can authorize such an exception to the American Rule, fees may no
longer be predicated on the "private attorney general" doctrine.3 6 The
Supreme Court refused to support the award of fees to prevailing parties
based on public policy and held that the prevailing plaintiff could not re-
cover fees from the respondent.37
31. The practice of litigants bearing the cost of their own legal representation is com-
monly called the American Rule. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Note, Promoting the Vindication
of Civil Rights Through the Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 347 (1980)
(discussing the American Rule and its origins). The American Rule is distinguished from the
English Rule, which generally requires the losing party to pay reasonable attorney's fees. See
RICHARD M. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 518 (7th ed. 1977). Other
European countries employ a similar rule that at least part of the prevailing party's costs are to
be paid by the litigant who lost at trial. See WERNER PFENNINGSTORF, LEGAL EXPENSE
INSURANCE: THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE IN FINANCING LEGAL SERVICES 39 (1975).
32. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
33. Id. at 241.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 270. The Court rejected the "private attorney general doctrine." Id. at 270
n.46. Alyeska effectively ended a court's power "to award attorney's fees to a prevailing party
whenever they 'deem the public policy furthered by a particular statute important enough to
warrant the award.' " Cubita et al., supra note 6, at 285-86 (quoting Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263).
The private attorney general doctrine originated in Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S;
400 (1968) (per curiam). There, the Court held "that one who succeeds in obtaining an injunc-
tion under ... Title [II] should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circum-
stances would render such an award unjust." Id. at 402. The Court reasoned that the
plaintiff, in bringing the law suit, does so not only for himself, but acts as a private attorney
general. Id.; see also Cubita, et al., supra note 6, at 284-85 (explaining how the reasoning in
Newman has been followed in numerous lower federal courts); Robert L. Weiner, Note,
Awarding Attorneys' Fees to the "Private Attorney General" Judicial Green Light to Private
Litigation in Public Interest, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 733, 742-48 (1973) (same).
36. Aleyska, 421 U.S. at 262-63; see also Cubita et al., supra note 6, at 285.
37. Aleyska, 421 U.S. at 270-71 (citations omitted). The Court stated:
We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the "American Rule" with
respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees. It has been criticized in recent years, and
courts have been urged to find exceptions to it. It is also apparent from our national
[Vol. 41:871
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After A Iyeska, an exception to the general rule against fee-shifting is per-
mitted only if there is a specific provision in a federal statute that provides
for such fee-shifting, or in two narrow instances.3" First, under the "bad
faith exception," a court may order a party who has litigated unfairly to pay
the attorney's fees of the other party.39 Second, under the "common fund
doctrine," a court has the power to award fees to a plaintiff "where a plain-
tiff has successfully maintained his suit, usually on behalf of a class, that
benefits a group of others in the same manner as himself."' The use of the
common fund doctrine is generally limited to actions in which no statutory
guidelines exist concerning the award of attorney's fees.4" Most federal stat-
utes, since Alyeska, have adopted a fee-shifting provision.4 2
Statutes which authorize the award of attorney's fees have been promul-
gated largely to address two concerns-equity and incentives.43 Statutory
fee-shifting provisions both encourage plaintiffs to bring actions under the
statutes to enforce their rights and provide the incentive necessary to en-
courage attorneys to learn and practice the applicable area of law.
C Fee-Shifting Statutes
Several statutes permit substantial judicial discretion for courts to award
fees to either party, whether or not the party has prevailed." Still other
experience that the encouragement of private action to implement public policy has
been viewed as desirable in a variety of circumstances. But the rule followed in our
courts with respect to attorneys' fees has survived. It is deeply rooted in our history
and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature's province by
redistributing litigation costs in the manner suggested by the respondents and fol-
lowed by the Court of Appeals.
The decision below must therefore be reversed.
Id.
38. See Cubita et al., supra note 6, at 286.
39. See Dreyfuss, supra note 31, at 349 n.22 (discussing FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b), (c) and
41(d), where the bad faith exception has been partially codified, and FED. R. App. P. 38, which
awards fees against an appellant for frivolous appeals).
40. Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 392 (1970); see also Mark H. Berlind,
Note, Attorney's Fees Under ERISA: When is an Award Appropriate, 71 CORNELL L. REV.
1037, 1039 (1986).
41. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 464 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding that because of ERISA's
fee provision, application of the common fund doctrine is not usually necessary).
42. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
43. See Rowe, supra note 29, at 653-66. Rowe discusses several theories used to justify
fee-shifting, including the following rationales: to assure fairness, to compensate legal injury,
to act as a punitive measure, to equalize the strengths of the parties, and to provide economic
incentives. Id.
44. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 305(0, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(0 (1988) (explaining that in any
judicial proceeding under this section, the court may award costs of litigation-including rea-
sonable attorney and expert witness fees); see also Cubita et al., supra note 6, at 320 n.205
(listing several different statutes which use such a fee-shifting standard).
19921
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statutes remove all discretion and require a mandatory award of attorney's
fees to the prevailing party.4 5 The most familiar fee-shifting statute is the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976 (Fees Award Act).4 6 The
United States Supreme Court has construed the Fees Award Act in favor of
both prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants.
Under the Fees Award Act, the court has found that the prevailing plain-
tiff "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust."'4 7 Therefore, fees are awarded based
on Congressional desire to encourage harmed individuals to seek remedial
relief, and are only denied if circumstances are present that would make an
award unjust.
48
The Supreme Court's approach to prevailing defendants, on the other
hand, has been more exacting. The Court enunciated the standard to be
applied to cases involving a prevailing defendant in Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC.49 In Christiansburg, the EEOC sued the Christiansburg Gar-
ment Company based on an individual's charge of racial discrimination. 50
The Court granted the company summary judgment, but refused to award
attorney's fees because the EEOC's action was not "unreasonable or merit-
less,"'" and the Commission's interpretation of the applicable law was not
"frivolous." 5 2 In this Title VII case, the Court expanded the traditional bad
faith standard to include the requirement that a plaintiff's lawsuit must be
"frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even if not brought in sub-
jective bad faith."5 3 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Stewart rea-
soned that awarding fees to a prevailing plaintiff guards them "against a
45. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (1976); see also Cubita et al., supra note 6, at 321 n.206 (listing 17 such statutes).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). Section 1988 reads:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985,
and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 or title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow a prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs.
Id. (citations omitted).
47. Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
48. Id.
49. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
50. Id. at 414.
51. Id. at 423.
52. Id. at 424.
53. Id. at 421. This standard was adopted for civil rights cases in Hughes v. Rowe, 449
U.S. 5, 14 (1980). In Hughes, petitioner filed an action against Illinois correction officers
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 8. The complaint was dismissed and the district court ordered
the petitioners to pay counsel fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Id. The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 9. The Supreme Court reversed and adopted the "frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation" standard of Christiansburg, for use in awarding attor-
ney's fees against petitioners in civil rights cases. Id. at 2; see also Cubita et al., supra note 6,
at 302 (discussing the application of the bad faith rule and the cases in which it was applied).
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violator of federal law .... [T]hese policy considerations which support the
award of fees to a prevailing plaintiff are not present in the case of a prevail-
ing defendant."5 4
As illustrated by the cases mentioned above, the bifurcated standard
under the Fees Award Act favors the prevailing plaintiff." While the rule of
the Fees Award Act is often applied to benefit claims cases under section
502(g)(1) of ERISA, courts rarely acknowledge application of the Fees
Award Act standard.5 6 Rather, different standards are applied to interpret
ERISA's fee-shifting statute, resulting in inconsistent fee awards from circuit
to circuit.5 7
D. Case Law: How Courts Determine the Award of Fees
1. The Tenth Circuit: The Eaves Test
Under section 502(g)(1), courts have discretionary power to award fees to
either party.58 Because there are no guidelines in the Act's legislative his-
tory or in the fee-shifting provision,59 courts look to many different sources
when developing a test to determine fee awards. 6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has developed
the test most often adopted by the circuits. In Eaves v. Penn,61 a participant
54. Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 418-19; see also Cubita et al., supra note 6, at 302 (discuss-
ing Justice Stewart's unanimous opinion and distinguishing different standards to be applied
when awarding fees to a prevailing plaintiff).
55. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 427 (1983) (interpreting the Fees Award Act as
creating a presumption in favor of awarding fees to a prevailing plaintiff).
56. The language of ERISA § 502(g)(1) allows the court to award attorney's fees to either
party. However, as with the bifurcated standard under the Fees Award Act, the courts rarely
award fees to a prevailing defendant unless there is evidence of bad faith on the part of the
plaintiff, or the plaintiff has brought a frivolous or unmeritorious suit. See Madden v. ITT
Long Term Disability Plan for Salaried Employees, 914 F.2d 1279, 1287 (9th Cir. 1990) (hold-
ing for defendant on the merits, but refusing to award fees to the defendant), cert. denied, 11
S. Ct. 964 (1991); Hope v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 1245, 785 F.2d
826, 831 (9th Cir.) (granting partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant but refusing
to reverse the denial of attorney's fees to the defendant), cert. dismissed, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
57. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1988); see supra note 5 (setting forth the specific language of
the section).
59. See 1973 HouSE REPORT, supra note 28, at 5107. The legislative history provides
only that "[fin any action brought by a participant or beneficiary, the court may allow reason-
able attorney's fees or costs to either party." Id.
60. For example, the Seventh Circuit has adopted the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d) (1988),
standard for awarding fees to a prevailing defendant. Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728
F.2d 820, 830 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying the Eaves test in much the same way as EAJA when
plaintiff appealed the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant).
61. 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978). Commonly known as the Eaves test, the majority's
five-prong test is accepted by all circuits. See infra notes 62-92 and accompanying text, for a
detailed explanation of the acceptance of the Eaves test by various circuits.
1992]
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in an employee profit sharing plan, along with the Secretary of Labor,
brought suit against the trustee of the plan for failure to act soley in the
interest of the plan's participants and beneficiaries as required by ERISA.6 2
The trial court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiff; however, the Secre-
tary of Labor contested the award.6 3 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit deter-
mined that the trustee failed to fulfill his fiduciary duty to the plan and
required him to make the appropriate restorations to the plan."4 Addition-
ally, the Eaves court remanded the case to the district court for a determina-
tion of whether or not attorney's fees should be awarded.6 5
The Tenth Circuit instructed the district court to base the determination
of an award of attorney's fees on five factors: (1) the degree of the offending
parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the offending parties to
personally satisfy an award of attorney's fees; (3) whether or not an award of
attorney's fees against the offending parties would deter other persons acting
under similar circumstances; (4) the amount of benefit conferred on mem-
bers of the pension plan as a whole; and (5) the relative merits of the parties'
position.6 6 Today, most courts use the five-prong Eaves test, or a close ap-
proximation, although each court's interpretation of the test has produced
varying results.
2. Application of the Eaves Test by Other Circuits
Although every circuit has adopted the Eaves test, the test has been incon-
sistently applied. 67 In particular, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have ex-
62. Id. at 454. Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA requires one to act soley in the interest of § 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
63. Eaves, 587 F.2d at 462.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 464-65.
66. Id. at 453.
67. The Eaves test has been adopted in some form by all circuits. See Gray v. New Eng-
land Tel. & Tel. Co., 792 F.2d 251, 257 (1st Cir. 1986) (holding that a former employer may
prevail in an action by former employee for alleged refusal to provide notice of pension benefits
in violation of ERISA under the Eaves five-factor test); Miles v. New York State Teamsters
Conference Pension & Retirement Fund Employee Benefit Plan, 698 F.2d 593, 602 (2d. Cir.)
(reversing an award of attorney's fees to employees in an action against the benefit plan's
trustees for arbitrarily and capriciously denying the employees service credits, based on the
Eaves five-factor test), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 829 (1983); Ursic v. Bethlehem Mines, 719 F.2d
670, 672-73 (3d Cir. 1983) (affirming award of attorney's fees, based on the Eaves test, to
plaintiff who prevailed in an action against employer by demonstrating continuous discharge
of employees to deprive them of their pension rights); Davidson v. Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225, 242
n.33 (E.D. Va. 1983) (allowing reasonable attorney's fees to plaintiff who brought an ERISA
action against the current and former trustees of a health and welfare benefit trust fund for
breach of fiduciary duty pursuant to the Eaves five-factor test), aff'd without opinion, 734 F.2d
10 (4th Cir. 1984); Iron Workers Local No. 272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1266 (5th Cir. 1980)
(adopting the five-factor Eaves test as a guideline to assist district courts in exercising their
discretion in ERISA actions); Department of Labor v. King, 775 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 1985)
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panded the factors beyond those of the Eaves test, in an effort to determine if
and when attorney's fees should be awarded. The Sixth Circuit, which ini-
tially rejected the Eaves test, subsequently incorporated the factors in section
502(g)(1) attorney's fee determinations. Relevant case law in the Ninth, Sev-
enth and Sixth Circuits is discussed below to illustrate the disparate treat-
ment applied by the circuits.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has held that no
one factor of the Eaves test is dispositive,65 nor must all of the factors be met
or even considered in every case. 69 In Carpenters Southern California Ad-
ministration Corp. v. Russell,7" the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
vacated the district court's award of attorney's fees to the prevailing defend-
ant and remanded the case for redetermination. 7' The Ninth Circuit sug-
gested that the five factors of the Eaves test should guide the court,72 but
generally attorney's fees should not be charged against ERISA plaintiffs.73
Even while adopting the Eaves test, the Ninth Circuit has held that the
Fees Award Act approach 74 should be applied to ERISA cases." In Smith
(applying the Eaves test in an intervening action by trustee of employee benefits plan challeng-
ing loans allowed by original trustee); Leigh v. Engle, 858 F.2d 361, 369-70 (7th Cir. 1988)
(affirming use of the five-factor Eaves test as the standard when determining whether to award
attorney's fees to a beneficiary of an employee's profit sharing trust who brought an action
against a plan administrator for alleged violation of fiduciary duty under ERISA), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1078 (1989); Lawrence v. Westerhaus, 749 F.2d 494, 496 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding a
claimant is entitled to reapply for attorney's fees once case is reconsidered and adopting Eaves
five-factor test as a guideline for district courts); Hummell v. S.E. Rykoff & Co., 634 F.2d 446,
453 (9th Cir. 1980) (adopting the Eaves five-factor test as a guideline to be used by the district
courts when employer appealed decision that an anticompetitive clause in profit-sharing plan
violated ERISA); Fine v. Semet, 699 F.2d 1091, 1095 (11 th Cir. 1983) (affirming trial court's
denial of attorney's fees based on Eaves test); Lucas v. Teamsters Local 639 Pension Trust, 2
E.B.C. 1998 (D.D.C. 1981) (adopting by reference the five-factor test in action by a plan).
68. Terpinas v. Seafarer's Int'l Union, 722 F.2d 1445, 1448 (9th Cir. 1984) (reversing and
remanding decision denying attorney's fees to a union member who prevailed in an ERISA
suit to recover a minimum disability pension).
69. See, e.g., Carpenters S. Cal. Admin. Corp. v. Russell, 726 F.2d 1410, 1416 (9th Cir.
1984) (remanding action of an administrator of a plan who brought action against an employer
for failure to make benefit contributions and ordering court to consider the five-factor test,
although cautioning that no one factor should be decisive).
70. 726 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1984).
71. Id. at 1417.
72. Id. at 1416.
73. Id.
74. Under the Fees Award Act approach, the prevailing plaintiff should ordinarily re-
cover attorney's fees. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
75. See Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension Trust, 746 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1984). In
Smith, a prevailing plaintiff in an ERISA benefits denial case appealed the denial of attorney's
fees. The appellate court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of attorney's fees award
under the Fee Awards Act approach. See also McConnell v. MEBA Medical & Benefit Plan,
759 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1985) (reversing and remanding plaintiff's motion for attorney's
fees).
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v. CMTA-JAM Pension Trust,7 6 the court noted the remedial nature of ER-
ISA and stated that prevailing employee plaintiffs should ordinarily recover
attorney's fees from ERISA defendants.77 Such an award, the court rea-
soned, would deter trustees from opposing employee benefit claims where
plaintiffs had a great chance of success.7 ' The Eaves five-factor test contin-
ues to be cited as part of the court's rationale, but in fact is mentioned simply
as a formality. What has resulted in the Ninth Circuit is a presumption in
favor of a prevailing plaintiff.
79
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in contrast,
provides a prevailing plaintiff and a prevailing defendant with the same op-
portunity to collect attorney's fees. In Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus-
tries,"° a former employee appealed from summary judgment in favor of his
former employer in a retaliatory termination action under ERISA. The cir-
cuit court affirmed the lower court's decision, but reversed the district
court's award of attorney's fees to the defendants.
The Seventh Circuit, in Bittner, adopted the standard of the Equal Access
to Justice Act (EAJA) for determining whether prevailing defendants should
collect attorney's fees. 8  Under the EAJA standard, a court may award a
prevailing defendant attorney's fees in an ERISA action unless the court
finds the plaintiff's position to be "substantially justified or that special cir-
cumstances make an award unjust. "82 The Bittner court reversed the award
of attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant and remanded the matter for
further determination as to whether the facts justified such an award.83
In contrast to other circuits, the Sixth Circuit initially maintained a pro-
plaintiff position and expressly rejected the Eaves test. Two years after the
adoption of the five-factor test in Eaves v. Penn, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan rejected that test in Central
76. 746 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1984).
77. Id. at 589.
78. Id. at 590.
79. Id. at 589.
80. 728 F.2d 820 (7th Cir. 1984).
81. Id. at 830.
82. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988)). Section 2412(d)(1)(A) states in perti-
nent part:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevail-
ing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any
costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action
(other than cases sounding in tort).., brought by or against the United States in any
court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the
U.S. was substantially justified or that special circumstances make award unjust.
Id.
83. Bittner, 728 F.2d at 831. The court analogized the EAJA to § 502(g)(1), reasoning




States Southwest Areas Pension v. Hithchings Truckings, Inc. 84 The district
court stated that the Eaves test would unnecessarily complicate the general
rule that prevailing plaintiffs in an ERISA case should be awarded fees un-
less special circumstances existed that would make such an award unjust.85
The court reasoned that the key element to consider in an award of attor-
ney's fees under section 502(g)(1) was the merit of the parties' position.
86
Courts in the Sixth Circuit continued to award fees to prevailing plaintiffs,
but refused to award fees to prevailing defendants in the absence of bad faith
or a frivolous or unmeritorious suit.87
In the past few years, however, the law in the Sixth Circuit has become
inconsistent and confusing. Five years after Central States, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Department of Labor v.
King,88 suggested that the district court should look at the Eaves test as
adopted by other circuits in similar section 502(g)(1) cases, to determine the
appropriateness of attorney's fee awards.89 Subsequent cases interpreted
King as adopting the Eaves five-factor test.9" Moreover, the adoption of the
Eaves test destroyed the once strong presumption in the Sixth Circuit in
favor of an award of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in benefits cases.9 '
The inconsistent standards, as discussed above, are clearly inappropriate
for a federal statute. Such inconsistencies deter potential plaintiffs and their
attorneys from bringing ERISA actions. Further, substantial administrative
and economic barriers also prevent plaintiffs from bringing ERISA benefit
claims.
84. 492 F. Supp. 906, 910 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (awarding fees to a pension fund that
brought an action against an employer to recover past due contributions on behalf of
employees).
85. Id. at 909.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Browning v. Gutchess, 843 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir. 1988) (not recommended for
publication) (awarding prevailing plaintiff attorney's fees in an ERISA action involving retalia-
tory discharge); Martin v. General Motors Corp., 753 F. Supp. 1347, 1359 (E.D. Mich. 1991)
(denying employee attorney's fees based on lack of bad faith on part of employer when former
employer prevailed in action by employee seeking benefits).
88. 775 F.2d 666, 670 (6th Cir. 1985).
89. Id. at 669.
90. See Sweet v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 913 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1990); Central
States Pension Fund v. 888 Corp., 813 F.2d 760 (6th Cir. 1987).
91. Ann C. Bertino, Circuit Case Study (Jan. 1992) (study on file at the Pension Rights
Center, Washington, D.C.).
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II. ANALYSIS: THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF CURRENT LAW
A. Case Law: Disparity Among the Circuits
A recent trend of courts hearing ERISA cases has been to deny fees to a
prevailing plaintiff based on a lack of evidence of the defendant's bad faith.92
The lack of a clearly enunciated standard with ERISA, in conjunction with
ERISA's cloudy legislative history regarding section 502(g)(1), require
courts to use their discretion when deciding whether or not to award attor-
ney's fees. 93 The result is the erratic, inconsistent, and conflicting interpreta-
tion of the Eaves test among the circuits.94
A recent study of ERISA benefits cases in each circuit95 revealed strik-
ingly disparate application of the Eaves test. 96 In all of the circuits, 97 there
are cases where the appellate courts have generally ruled for the plaintiffs on
the ERISA claim but have nonetheless denied fees. 98 Many of these cases
denied plaintiffs attorney's fees without justification. 99 Some opinions sug-
gest that the court denied attorney's fees because of the lack of bad faith on
the part of the opposing party."° In other cases, the court's denial was
based upon the plaintiff's failure to prevail on all issues in the case.'01 The
study concluded that prevailing plaintiffs are commonly denied attorney's
fees in many of the circuits and, further, that the courts apply no uniform
standard when determining such denials. 102
B. Lack of Attorney Participation
Beyond judicially and legislatively imposed barriers, economic barriers
present a further impediment to ERISA actions. Most potential plaintiffs
92. See, e.g., Blanton v. Anzalone, 760 F.2d 989, 992 (9th Cir. 1985) (denying a benefici-
ary, who prevailed in action against trustees for breach of fiduciary duty, attorney's fees based
on lack of evidence that defendants acted in bad faith), appeal after remand, 813 F.2d 1574
(9th Cir. 1987); Paris v. F. Korbel & Bros., 751 F. Supp. 834, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (denying
attorney's fees, based on lack of bad faith on part of employer, to an employee who prevailed in
an action against the employer for failure to advise employee of her Consolidated Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) rights under ERISA). COBRA requires em-
ployers operating ERISA plans to offer continuation coverage to employees after they leave
their jobs with that employer.
93. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (explaining various interpretations of
awards of attorney's fees in ERISA benefits cases).
94. Id.





100. Id. at 7, 9.
101. Id. at 3-7, 12-13.
102. Bertino, supra note 91.
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are low-income pensioners seeking to recover a pension benefit. The na-
tional average private pension amount for men is $5,700 and for women is
$3,240.13 These same individuals generally retire with less than $10,000 in
total savings, not including their home and car,"° and receive an average of
only $7,200 a year from Social Security."°5 Therefore, given that most re-
tired persons have little income, it is almost impossible for them to retain an
attorney willing and capable of litigating a complex ERISA case. Specifi-
cally, because the relief sought is usually a pension benefit of a minimum
monthly amount, it is often impossible for a plaintiff to retain an attorney on
a contingency fee basis.106
In addition to the award of attorney's fees for a prevailing plaintiff, the
options available to potential plaintiffs include the pro bono or public inter-
est bar. While the pro bono bar has grown in recent years, 10 7 it is still inade-
quate to meet the needs of those covered in over 900,000 private pension
plans.'0" There is over 1.6 trillion dollars in private pension plans and 4.5
million dollars in private health and welfare benefit plans that are subject to
regulation under ERISA.' °9 Private enforcement is an essential element to
the regulation of ERISA. It is not foreseeable that the public interest and
pro bono bar will grow at an exponential rate. Thus, in reality, only the
small private plaintiff attorney bar, currently in existence, is available to
meet the needs of an increasingly older population. 10
103. See Park, supra note 24, at 26 n.6.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. In addition, punitive damages are generally not available under ERISA. See Massa-
chusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985) (holding that § 409(a) of
ERISA does not provide a cause of action for extra-contractual damages in beneficiary claims
for injury sustained due to improper or untimely processing of benefit claims); Attorney's Fee
Phone Survey (August 1990) (results on file at the Pension Rights Center, Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter Phone Survey] (reporting that an attorney in the Tenth Circuit was denied attor-
ney's fees as a sanction for seeking punitive damages after the Russell decision).
107. The Pension Rights Center in Washington, D.C., coordinates a national network of
lawyers (National Pension Assistance Project (NPAP)) who are willing to take pension cases
on behalf of plaintiffs. Most will offer their services either pro bono or at a reduced rate.
Currently there are 375 attorneys representing all fifty states in the network.
108. Letter from Elizabeth Dole, Secretary of Labor, U.S. Dept. of Labor to Bob Dole,
Minority Leader, U.S. Senate (1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter Dole Letter] (listing
DOL's most recent proposals). This letter outlines draft bill language that would amend ER-
ISA to provide additional incentive for participants and beneficiaries to exercise their rights
under ERISA in fiduciary violation cases.
109. Fred Strasser, ERISA: A Law With No Teeth?, NAT'L L.J., July 16, 1990, at I (quot-
ing Karen Ferguson, Executive Director of Pension Rights Center).
110. Raising a Bigger Pension Umbrella, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 13, 1991, at 18
(reporting that by the year 2030, the number of Americans over the age of 65 will double to
over 46,000,000).
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Although many attorneys specialize in ERISA, most represent employers,
pension plans, or plan administrators. Even if the plaintiff bar grew, most
retirees still could not afford to retain the services of one of these attorneys.
Low income legal services somewhat fill the gap, but many of these service
groups lack the resources necessary to bring complex ERISA actions in fed-
eral court. In addition, the complexity, substantial time commitment, and
high cost of litigation deter private attorneys from taking these cases on a
pro bono basis.
C. Agency Enforcement
The limited enforcement capacity of the DOL and the IRS undermines
the protection of the rights of participants and beneficiaries. As the law
presently exists, the defense has a great advantage over the plaintiff."' The
drafters of ERISA anticipated "vigorous enforcement by the Department of
Labor."" 2 In reality, the DOL lacks the necessary resources to monitor the
nearly one million private pension plans that exist today.13 The DOL's re-
cent admission that it does not have the resources for effective enforcement
of ERISA has sparked increased interest to seek out viable incentives for
plaintiffs' attorneys." 4 Problems remain, however, regarding the DOL's
protection of ERISA participants and beneficiaries." 5 Such problems are a
constant source of controversy for the DOL, plaintiffs' advocates, and indus-
try participants in ERISA plans." 6
Under ERISA, there are two types of action that participants or benefi-
ciaries can bring under section 502: an action against fiduciaries of the plan
for fiduciary violations' and an action to recover benefits under the
plan." 8 In a set of recent proposals, the DOL suggested that attorney's fees
and expert witness fees should become mandatory for prevailing plaintiffs in
actions where a plan administrator has violated ERISA's fiduciary obliga-
tions. "' The DOL did not suggest, however, that the same standard should
apply to prevailing plaintiffs in benefits cases. 120 Moreover, the DOL's pro-
111. Michael Gordon, a Washington attorney who participated in the drafting of ERISA,
stated: " '[alt the present time, things are out of balance ... [because] the defense in ERISA





115. AARP Statement, supra note 17.
116. Id.
117. 29 U.S.C. § 1332 (1)(3) (1988).
118. 29 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(1)(A) & (B).
119. Dole Letter, supra note 108, at 1.
120. One reason for the DOL's position may be the "powerful political forces" such as the
large labor unions and employers who enjoy the benefits of the current law. Strasser, supra
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posal regarding attorney's fees in fiduciary actions creates the illusion that
the DOL is addressing a serious problem. In reality, the proposal draws few
objections from those in the employment industry because it addresses a
non-issue. The DOL itself has the power to and, indeed, does bring most
fiduciary actions, while most needworthy plaintiffs are only involved in bene-
fits actions. 
12 1
The more typical ERISA action involves the denial of pension or health
benefits to a participant who believes that he or she is entitled to such bene-
fits. 122 The statute's failure to extend the prevailing plaintiff standard to
benefit denial actions, in addition to DOL's refusal to lobby for such exten-
sion, continues to make these actions subject to the five-factor Eaves test to
determine if fees should be awarded. 12' As discussed above, this test has
been applied inconsistently. 124  Accordingly, because of inconsistent case
law, lack of attorney participation, and lack of substantial agency enforce-
ment, participants hesitate to bring ERISA actions. 2 '
note 109, at 1 (quoting Karen Ferguson). The DOL's proposal to award fees in fiduciary
actions may sound like a major step forward in support of plaintiffs. However, it is little more
than a token gesture. Abuse of fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs is more common than fiduci-
ary violations, which may be why industry lobbies intensively against mandatory fees for pre-
vailing plaintiffs in benefits cases. While fiduciary violations are often serious, they are few and
far between. As one practitioner has put it, " ' [ i]n 17 years, I have yet to find a case where the
employer was indeed ripping off the pension fund, and I get about 700 calls a year.'" Id. at 27
(quoting Ronald Dean, sole practitioner in Pacific Palisades, Cal. and a leading ERISA plain-
tiff's attorney). Such increased enforcement provisions, however, are a favorite topic of the
DOL, in contrast to the DOL's lack of support for prevailing plaintiffs in benefits cases.
121. The AARP stated:
The Department of Labor has proposed requiring the award of reasonable attorney's
fees and expert witness fees to prevailing plaintiffs in successful fiduciary breach
cases. . . .However, the Department has not gone far enough in its proposal by
limiting such fees to fiduciary breach cases. The Department itself is charged with
investigating fiduciary breach cases. While empowering individuals, through attor-
neys fees, to supplement Labor's fiduciary enforcement efforts is entirely consistent
with the purpose of ERISA, the individual should not be left without recourse for
benefit claim cases.
AARP Statement, supra note 17, at 3-4; see also PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES (1991) (outlin-
ing the DOL's enforcement activities and specific cases).
122. There are over 900,000 private plans. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
Relatively few pension and health benefit cases are brought each year. See supra note 91. The
logical conclusion is not that these plans are perfectly administered, but that few participants
and beneficiaries are enforcing their rights because they cannot afford to do so.
123. See supra notes 58-90 and accompanying text.
124. See supra part I.D.2.
125. See, e.g., PENSION RIGHTS CENTER, LITIGATING WORKER AND RETIREE PENSION
CASES 417 (1989).
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D. Resistance to Change
As described above, the ambiguity of the fee provision, the DOL's failure
to challenge such ambiguity, and the inconsistent application of the Eaves
test, have led to erratic fee awards. As a result, aggrieved participants have
little incentive or means to pursue their claims.126 These facts raise the issue
of why ERISA has not been amended to give meaning to its promise to
protect the rights of plan participants and beneficiaries. Industry's strong
resistance to any change of the current standard applied to participant's ben-
efits claims provides the strongest opposition to amendment.
1. Industry Speaks Out Against Attorney's Fees
On the whole, the pension and benefits industry is adamantly opposed to
the mandatory award of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in benefit
cases. 127 Testimony given before the ERISA Enforcement Working Group
of the Department of Labor's Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
(PWBA Working Group) and the Senate Subcommittee on Labor (SSOL) by
the Association of Private Pension & Welfare Plans (APPWP), Western
Conference of Teamsters Pension Fund (Western Fund), American Counsel
of Life Insurance/Health Insurance Association of America (ACLI) and the
ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC) outlines industry's collective opposi-
tion to such changes as well as the basis for such opposition. 128 Many of the
concerns these groups articulated revolved around the perceived cost of
reforms. 
129
The APPWP stated that it preferred that the DOL not pursue its entire
enforcement package,1 30 including attorney's fees awards, because there was
no evidence that the DOL was not fulfilling its obligations under ERISA and
because such a change could fuel additional amendments of ERISA beyond
those intended by the DOL. 3' Regarding the mandatory award of attorney
126. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
127. PENSION & WELFARE BENEFITS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT OF WORK-
ING GROUP ON ERISA ENFORCEMENT TO THE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WEL-
FARE & PENSION BENEFIT PLANS, (1990) [hereinafter DOL REPORT] (listing in condensed
form the testimony presented to the Working Group).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 19 (testimony of Western Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund). The
Western Fund's concern is that the attorney's fees proposals (for fiduciary cases) would result
in costly litigation to the fund.
130. Id. at 8. This position is based on two assumptions: 1) the belief that there is no
evidence that the DOL's enforcement of ERISA is lacking, and 2) the fear that the proposals
may be seen by Congress as merely a first step that would need to be expanded, perhaps be-
yond what the DOL had originally intended.
131. Id. APPWP testified:
First, we do not believe that persuasive evidence has been presented that DOL is not
doing its job as the enforcer of ERISA .... Second, we believe that no matter how
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and expert witness fees to a prevailing plaintiff in fiduciary cases, the
APPWP testified that it believed the current law furthered the purposes of
ERISA without inviting unmeritorious suits and that the DOL's suggested
proposals went too far. 1
32
The testimony given by the Western Fund opined that the changes pro-
posed by the DOL will be costly to the plan and detrimental to plan partici-
pants.' 33 Western Fund stated: "[t]he costs of government regulation and
of litigation are paid out of the fund, and reduce the assets available to pay
benefits to participants."'' 34  Western Plan testified that it believed that the
mandatory award of attorney's fees would be used "as [a] lever to force the
fund into settling cases."' 35 It concluded that this would be harmful to plan
participants because funds originally earmarked for benefits would be redi-
rected to pay litigation expenses.'
36
The ACLI has also opposed the DOL's mandatory attorney's fee propo-
sal. 13  In its testimony, ACLI argued that "there is no evidence that the
current discretionary attorney fee system is not working." 138 The ACLI,
like Western Fund, indicated that "[m]andatory fee awards would increase
the cost of litigation for plans and [would] stimulate additional litigation
over fee issues." 13' Therefore, the ACLI argued, the mandatory attorney's
fee proposal was not necessary and changing the current system to add such
a provision would prove too costly.1 40
well-intentioned or carefully crafted the DOL proposal may be, it will be seized upon
by some in Congress as merely a modest first step which needs to be expanded well
beyond what the DOL envisions or could even support.
Id. at 8 (alteration in original).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 19. The Western Fund's concern is a valid one: Theoretically, the more money
spent on litigation, the less money there is to spend on participant benefits.
134. Id.
135. Id. At first glance, fund depletion seems like a valid concern. However, because a
plaintiff would first have to prevail to be awarded fees under the DOL's proposals, the fund
need not feel pressured into settling where it feels it is correct. Further, a participant who
pursues a frivolous or unmeritorious claim, or who proceeds in bad faith, runs the risk of being
sanctioned for attorney's fees. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Further, it is patently unfair that
participants who have already paid, through their work and salary deductions, to have these
benefits afforded them should have to pay additional costs to get them when they are unfairly
denied.
136. DOL REPORT, supra note 127.
137. Id. at 29.
138. Id. The ACLI expressed concern about the perceived increases in cost should fees be
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Finally, the ERIC testified not only in regard to the DOL proposals, but
also to the problem with the pension benefit system as a whole.14 1 The
ERIC stated that "[i]f there is anything fundamentally wrong with the em-
ployee benefit system today, it is the complex and constantly changing regu-
latory regime that has been imposed on employee benefit plans." 142 The
ERIC asserted that the current system used to award attorney's fees is ade-
quate, and that inclusion of punitive damages was unnecessary without a
showing of problems that warrant such a measure.
14 3
2. Plaintiffs Advocates' Response: In Favor of Mandatory Fee Awards
Not surprisingly, public interest groups and plaintiffs' attorneys strongly
support the adoption of a mandatory award of attorney's fees to prevailing
plaintiffs in benefit cases.'" Groups such as The National Senior Citizens
Law Center (NSCLC), the American Association of Retired Persons
(AARP), and the Pension Rights Center (PRC) interact daily with retirees
working to enforce pensioner's rights under ERISA. In testimony before
Congress and agency working groups, these groups repeatedly advocated
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs.
For example, the NSCLC testified before the SSOL that the mandatory
award of attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in benefits cases would pro-
vide the assurances necessary for plaintiffs to enforce their rights under ER-
ISA. 145 The AARP echoed these sentiments in statements to the PWBA
141. Id. at 30. ERIC stated that numerous studies have indicated that the government's
enforcement efforts have been deficient. It believed that the problems with government en-
forcement should be the focus of attention, rather than encouraging private enforcement.
142. Id. Because of the potential cost involved, punitive damages are unpopular with in-
dustry groups such as ERIC.
143. The ERIC representative testified that:
[The DOL's] proposed incentives for new private litigation are unnecessary and will
severely damage employee benefit plans. The courts are already authorized to award
attorneys' fees and costs in appropriate cases .... Although the [the DOL] has not
included a punitive damages provision in its proposal, others are making punitive
damage proposals. No showing has been made of any problems or abuses that justify
draconian legislation of this kind.
Id.
144. Id. at 17; see also infra notes 145-66.
145. 1990 ERISA Hearings, supra note 18, at 1 (statement of Vicki Gottlich for the Na-
tional Senior Citizens Law Center (NSCLC)). Vicki Gottlich, the NSCLC representative, tes-
tified that:
The Department of [Labor] recognizes that participants need financial incentives in
order to engage in litigation to enforce their rights under ERISA and their benefit
plans.... ERISA litigation is costly and time consuming; the final benefit received by
many successful participants and beneficiaries is often less than the cost of the litiga-
tion.... The assurance that [low income client's] costs would be compensated if they




Working Group. 14 6 AARP stated that most individuals face several barriers
to bringing an ERISA action and are thus denied the opportunity to enforce
their rights under that body of law.' 4 7 AARP opined that the lack of
mandatory attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs in benefits cases effectively
denied such individuals access to the system.'4 ' AARP firmly believes that
the complexity of ERISA, coupled with the high cost of litigation in federal
court and the uncertainty of attorney's fees, preclude participants from find-
ing an attorney to assist in bringing a benefits claim. 149
Herbert Eisenberg, a plaintiffs' attorney from New York, in his statement
to the PWBA Working Group, suggested that the DOL's proposals failed to
fulfill ERISA's legislative purpose.' 5 ° He reminded the committee that the
award of fees to plaintiffs in benefit cases would occur only if the plaintiff
prevailed.'' Mr. Eisenberg, a small firm practitioner who regularly deals
with ERISA cases, stressed that the potential to receive attorney's fees
would in no way lead him to litigate an unmeritorious complaint.'5 2 He
Id. at 7.
146. The AARP representative testified, for example, that:
[because] [n]one of the agencies charged with enforcing ERISA is set up to effectively
handle the multitude of benefits claims and complaints that arise each year ...
[i]ndividuals often face an insurmountable problem. Plaintiff's attorneys are reluc-
tant to take such cases-the work is complex and there is little return for the effort.
Those with small claims have little chance of finding professional assistance. Those
with large claims, upon presenting a difficult case to an under-developed plaintiff's
bar, also often find a closed door. In essence, the individual is effectively denied
access to a system that is intended to be largely self-enforcing.
AARP Statement, supra note 17, at 4.
147. Id.
148. Id. At present, one who is denied benefits receives little help from the DOL and often
must turn to an attorney, if possible, for assistance. Id. As of 1990, the DOL's Office of
Technical Assistance and Inquiries was the only assistance mechanism available to partici-
pants. Id. The office handles over 70,000 inquiries per year, most through a letter which states
the current status of the law. Id. There are few resources available to provide individual
assistance. Id.
149. Id.
150. Herbert Eisenberg, Statement Before the Pension and Welfare Benefits Administra-
tion, Advisory Council on Employee Welfare & Pension Benefits Plans, August 20, 1990, at 2
[hereinafter Eisenberg Testimony].
151. Mr. Eisenberg stated that:
The Department of Labor's desire to limit the grant of attorney fees solely to demon-
strated breaches of fiduciary responsibility, and not advocating that these fees be
mandatory for a person wrongfully denied a pension benefit, points to a situation
where the statute is not fulfilling its legislative purpose. It must be remembered that
attorney fees are to be granted only where the plaintiff prevails. The imposition of
such mandatory attorney fees would require the Plan trustees to more carefully as-
sess whether or not a claim should be denied and bear the cost when those assess-
ments are found to have been erroneous.
Id. at 2.
152. Id. at 1.
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emphasized the awareness among the bar of the sanctions that are often im-
posed against an attorney who files a frivolous case.' 53 Mr. Eisenberg addi-
tionally stated he firmly believed that the ability of plan participants to
enforce their rights was directly related to their access to the courts.'
54
The National Employment Lawyers Association (NELA) has framed the
problem as one of many barriers precluding participants' private enforce-
ment of their rights under ERISA."' These barriers include: ERISA's
broad preemption provisions;' 56 the limited remedies available under ER-
ISA-in particular the unavailability of punitive damages;' 57 the standard of
review in disputes over benefits;'5 . the lack of a right to a jury trial; 5 9 and
the lack of consistent awards of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.' 6 °
Also, the NELA asserted that drawing a distinction between fiduciary duty
and benefit claim cases was improper and worked against plaintiffs enforcing
their rights under ERISA.16' Finally, they concluded that "the absence of a
153. Id.
154. Id. at 4.
155. See 1990 ERISA Hearings, supra note 18, at 8 (statement of Jeffrey Lewis) (summariz-
ing all barriers to plaintiffs bringing an action). All groups that have testified on behalf of
plaintiffs agree that these factors are significant barriers to a plaintiff bringing an action under
ERISA.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988); see Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987)
(characterizing ERISA's legislative history and finding that ERISA's preemption provision is
broad in scope and preempts most state laws).
157. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146-48 (1985) (holding
that there is no express, or implied, authority under ERISA for the award of punitive damages
or damages for emotional distress).
158. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (applying a de novo stan-
dard of review).
159. In re Vorpahl, 695 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding that present and former employ-
ees were not entitled to a jury trial in an ERISA action). The court in Vorpahl stated that
ERISA's silence on the issue of jury trials has been interpreted to mean that suits for pension
benefits are equitable and are thus triable by a court. Id.; see also Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d
1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980) (ERISA remedies are equitable and, therefore, do not entitle a
plaintiff to a jury trial); Wardle v. Central States Pension Fund, 627 F.2d 820, 830 (7th Cir.
1980) (ERISA does not give right to jury trial), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1112 (1981). But cf.
Ovitz v. Jefferies & Co., 553 F. Supp. 300 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding that an employee was
entitled to a jury trial in an ERISA, state fiduciary law, and breach of contract action against
his former employer). In Jefferies, the court reasoned that the claims were legal and not equi-
table because they were based on the employer's alleged obligation to pay the employee "cer-
tain amounts both 'unconditionally and immediately' on his resignation. Id. at 301.
160. See supra notes 92-102 and accompanying text.
161. Mr. Lewis testified that:
We disagree with this distinction between fiduciary duty and benefit claims cases. If
anything, mandatory attorney fees for prevailing plaintiffs are more necessary in ben-
efits claims cases .... Even the relatively small number of NELA member attorneys
who take plaintiffs' ERISA cases are reluctant to take these individual benefit claims
cases to court. On the one hand, ERISA's limitations on damages preclude the possi-
bility of any significant contingent fee recovery, while on the other hand, there is a
good chance that no attorney fees will be awarded by the court if the case is won ....
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provision for mandatory attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs has resulted
in a situation where it is virtually impossible for plaintiffs in ERISA plans
... to enforce their rights under the terms of the plan."' 6 2 Jeffrey Lewis,
testifying on behalf of the NELA, stated that in his experience as a practic-
ing attorney his "office turns down three to five such cases a week in the San
Francisco Bay Area alone, and there is only one other attorney in the area
who regularly considers taking such cases."' 63 Clearly, Mr. Lewis believes
that one reason attorneys turn down ERISA cases is the low incidence of
attorney's fees awards, as well as other barriers to success on the merits.' 64
Both the public interest groups and plaintiffs' attorneys recognize that be-
cause of the tremendous disincentive to participants bringing ERISA ac-
tions, many benefit claim denials go largely unchallenged. 65 Without such
challenges, plan administrators are not being monitored as ERISA intended.
With the growing number of private pension and benefits plans in existence
today, and the limited resources of the DOL and the IRS, without private
enforcement, ERISA is in effect a statute that "has no teeth."'
166
E. Comparing Section 502(g)(1) to Other Fee-Shifting Provisions
Under current law, there are numerous fee-shifting statutes,' 67 several of
which are particularly relevant in determining whether or not section
502(g)(1) is a properly operating fee-shifting provision.' 68 Two of these, a
permissive fee shifting provision under § 1988 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 [hereinafter § 1988]169 and the mandatory fee-shifting provision of
§ 626(b) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),17' are
particularly relevant. Courts have used these statutes to interpret fee awards
in benefit cases. 17' Comparison of each provision with section 502(g)(1) sup-
ports the proposition that section 502(g)(1) has failed to fully serve its pur-
pose. Further, these statutes provide insight into how section 502(g)(1) can
be improved.
1990 ERISA Hearings, supra note 18, at 8 (statement of Jeffrey Lewis).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 9.
165. AARP Statement, supra note 17, at 5. "Without a corresponding financial disincen-
tive to deter benefits claim denials, or a financial incentive for individuals to pursue claims,
benefits claims denials go largely unchallenged." Id.
166. See Strasser, supra note 109, at 1.
167. See generally Cubita, et al., supra note 6, at 320 nn.205-07 (listing numerous statutes
in which there are fee-shifting provisions).
168. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988); 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1988).
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
170. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
171. See supra note 30.
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1. Section 1988
Section 1988172 was enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision
in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.'7 3 In essence, this sec-
tion adopts the private attorney general doctrine referred to in Alyeska.'7 4
The purpose of § 1988 is to achieve consistency in fee awards among civil
rights cases.'75 The provision was "designed to allow courts to provide the
familiar remedy of reasonable counsel fees to prevailing parties in suits to
enforce the civil rights acts which Congress has passed since 1866. " ' 76 Fur-
ther, the legislative history of § 1988 suggests that fee awards are necessary
if private citizens are to enforce their statutorily-granted rights.'77 Congress
recognized the need for private enforcement of civil rights on behalf of the
public as a whole, and consequently enacted § 1988 as an "integral part of
the remedy necessary to achieve compliance with its statutory policies."'
' 78
Under § 1988, there is a presumption that a prevailing plaintiff should be
awarded attorney's fees, but the final determination is within the court's
discretion. 179
While the language of § 1988 is permissive, Congress' clear intent was to
award fees to a prevailing plaintiff.' For example, Congress provided that
fees could be awarded pendente lite, especially where a party prevailed on an
important matter without prevailing on all issues.'81 In addition, a party
can be considered to have prevailed "when they vindicate rights through a
172. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
173. 421 U.S. 240 (1975); see also supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text.
175. 1976 SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 5910.
176. Id. at 5909-10.
177. The legislative history of § 1988 states:
[C]ivil rights laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have
proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful opportunity to
vindicate the important Congressional policies which these laws contain. In many
cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the law
has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able
to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation's fundamental laws are
not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover
what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
Id. at 5910.
178. Id.
179. See City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974), appeal after re-
mand, 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977).
180. The legislative history specifically states that: "[lt is intended that the standards for
awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
A party seeking to enforce [its] rights .... if successful, 'should ordinarily recover an attorney's
fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.' " Id. at 5912 (quoting




consent judgment or without formally obtaining relief." 182 Nevertheless,
this presumption is mitigated by a provision that "deters frivolous suits by
authorizing an award of attorneys' fees against a party shown to have liti-
gated in 'bad faith' under the guise of attempting to enforce [their] federal
rights."' 3 The courts have developed two tests to determine the amount of
fees to be awarded under § 1988.
The original test to calculate attorney's fees under § 1988 was set forth in
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc."8 4 In Johnson, the plaintiff
brought an action for damages and a class action for injunctive relief for his
alleged racially motivated discharge from employment.'8 5 The court, in re-
viewing the attorney's fees award to the prevailing plaintiff, imposed an elab-
orate twelve-part test to determine whether or not fees will be awarded.
18 6
The court concluded that it would be an abuse of discretion for a district
court not to consider the twelve factors set out in this case, and that the
record must reflect such consideration.
1 8 7
Other courts have rejected the test set forth in Johnson and instead, apply
the more reliable "lodestar test" developed by the Second Circuit in City of
Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.'8 1 Under this test, the court first determines the
number of hours spent on the case by the attorney.' 8 9 Next, the court fixes a
reasonable hourly rate based on the attorney's legal reputation and his status
in the firm. 90 These hours are then multiplied by the rate to calculate the
total fee award. 9 ' The Grinnell test more closely embodies the spirit of the
law and encourages more attorneys to become involved in the area of civil
182. Id.
183. 1976 SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 5912. According to the legislative history,
awarding fees to a prevailing defendant is appropriate where the plaintiff's suit is shown to be
"clearly frivolous, vexatious, or brought for harassment purposes." Id. (citing United States
Steel Corp. v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Pa. 1974), aff'd, 519 F.2d 359 (3d Cir.
1975)). This is the standard laid out in FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
184. 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
185. Id. at 714.
186. Id. at 717-19. The twelve criteria, based on the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, are: (1) time and labor expended by counsel; (2) novelty and difficulty of the
case; (3) attorney's skills; (4) preclusive effect that this case had on the counsel's ability to take
other work; (5) attorney's customary fee; (6) contingent nature of the litigation; (7) unusual
time limitation imposed by the litigants; (8) amount of money involved in the claim; (9) experi-
ence, ability, and reputation of counsel; (10) undesirability of being associated with the cause;
(11) length of the litigant's and counsel's professional relationship; and (12) awards in similar
cases. Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Rule 2-106 (1980);
Dreyfuss, supra note 31, at 373, n.168.
187. 488 F.2d at 717, 720.
188. 495 F.2d 448, 473 (2d Cir. 1974).
189. Id. at 470.
190. Id. at 471.
191. Id.
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rights litigation.' 92 Further, this test is far less cumbersome than the John-
son test. Also, it permits the court to pay the attorney the amount he would
have earned litigating a case in the private sector, as opposed to the court
determining what the attorney's services are worth.19 3 Thus the Grinnell
test successfully respects Congress' intent that attorney's fees be "adequate
to attract competent counsel [while not] produc[ing] windfalls to
attorneys. "1
94
Despite the strong legislative history accompanying § 1988, its discretion-
ary nature is a constant source of difficulty.' 95 Courts have exercised wide
discretion to undercompensate, overcompensate, or deny relief entirely to
civil rights litigants where an attorney's fee award is viewed as unnecessary
or somehow inappropriate.196 In particular, judicial discretion allows courts
to deny relief despite the plaintiff's meeting of all the requirements justifying
recovery under § 1988.' 9' Further, courts have developed several common
grounds for denying relief.198 It has been suggested that such denials deter
attorneys from accepting cases for fear that they will not be adequately com-
pensated.' 99 Thus, the courts do not adhere to any strictly defined parame-
ters, although these factors are clearly enunciated in the legislative history
accompanying § 1988.2" This erratic awarding of attorney's fees has in ef-
fect worked against the purpose of § 1988 by discouraging attorneys from
taking such cases and leaving plaintiff's rights unvindicated.
2. Section 626(b)
The ADEA was enacted to "prohibit job discrimination against workers
between the ages of 40 and 70 years." '' Section 626(b) of the ADEA,
192. See Dreyfuss, supra note 31, at 375.
193. Id.
194. 1976 SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 5913.
195. Dreyfuss, supra note 31, at 351. Courts have used their discretion in a manner that
sometimes undercompensates litigants or denies them relief altogether. The result is often an
immediate appeal. As with ERISA cases, attorneys are likely to be more reluctant to take the
case because they are not assured of fee awards. Id. at 351-52.
196. Id. at 352.
197. Id. at 365-66 (suggesting that courts have created a variety of "special circumstances"
under which a fee award can be denied to a prevailing litigant event when the other require-
ments have been met).
198. Id. (suggesting that all of the grounds cited are unfounded given the broad legislative
intent behind the statute).
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974), appeal after
remand, 560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977). But cf. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488
F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).
201. JOSEPH E. KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 7 (1986). ADEA's
purpose is to "promote the employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age;
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find
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which requires a mandatory award of attorney's fees to a prevailing plain-
tiff,20 2 generally follows the remedial scheme of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA).2 °3 Under § 626(b), a prevailing plaintiff in a suit for age dis-
crimination is entitled to "a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the de-
fendant and the cost of [the] action." 2" The ADEA does not provide for
fees to a prevailing defendant. 20 5  Further, because the ADEA language
states that attorney's fees are available for the cost "of the action," it has
been held that compensation for services performed before commencement
of the action are disallowed.20 6
As with § 1988, the definition of "reasonable" under § 626(b) is the source
of some confusion. The Supreme Court has interpreted "reasonable" to
mean the approximate prevailing market rate in the relevant community.20 7
Beyond this, the courts apply the lodestar test originally set forth in Grin-
nell.2°8 Once the lodestar amount is determined, some courts apply the
twelve-factor test set forth in Johnson 209 to increase or decrease the award of
attorney's fees in light of all circumstances. 210 Because § 626(b) mandates
ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)
(1988).
202. The statute reads in pertinent part: "IThe court shall have jurisdiction to grant such
legal equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purpose of this chapter." 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (emphasis added).
203. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 211, 216 and 217. Section 216(a) covers the right of the
Administrator or his designated representative to investigate and gather data involving wages,
hours and other conditions and practices of employment subject to the FLSA. See KALET,
supra note 201, at 89. Section 626(b) incorporates § I I(b) and parts of § 16 of the FLSA. Id.
In pertinent part § 216(b) of FLSA states: "The court in such action shall, in addition to any
judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by
the defendant, and costs of action." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b).
205. See Cova v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 1978) (denying attor-
ney's fees to an employer who prevailed in an ADEA action). When fees are awarded to a
prevailing defendant, they are awarded under the bad faith exception to the American Rule as
laid out in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 420 U.S. 240 (1979). See supra
notes 31-41 and accompanying text. There is reluctance by courts to award fees to the defend-
ant under the bad faith exception. See Hoover v. Armco, Inc., 915 F.2d 355, 358 (8th Cir.
1990) (McMillian, J., dissenting) (warning that the "courts should be particularly reluctant to
award attorney's fees under the bad faith exception . . . [it can have an] undesirable chilling
effect on an attorney's legitimate ethical obligation to represent his [or her] client zealously"
(second alteration in original)).
206. See Koyen v. Consolidated Edison Co., 560 F. Supp. 1161, 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(holding that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees when a former employee
brought an action against his employer alleging a violation of the ADEA).
207. Blum v. Stetson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984) (deciding a case under § 1988 that is relevant to
ADEA); see also Kossman v. Calumet County, 849 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1988).
208. 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
209. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974); see supra notes
184-86 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g., Jones v. Central Soya Co., 748 F.2d 586 (11th Cir. 1984).
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the award of a fee to a prevailing plaintiff, these factors relate soley to the
amount of fees to be awarded.2 ' Consequently, the predictability of attor-
ney's fees awards under ADEA has promoted the statute's intent of provid-
ing those discriminated against with a meaningful mechanism to enforce
their rights under the statute.2 12
3. Comparing Section 502(g)(1) to Sections 1988 and 626(b)
While § 1988 and § 502(g)(1) each use a discretionary standard for award-
ing attorney's fees, the courts interpret the awards differently under each
statute.21 3 Pursuant to § 1988, fees are awarded only if the party prevails.2 14
Under section 502(g)(1), however, fees may be awarded to either party,
whether or not the party prevails, according to the discretion of the court.21 5
The legislative history of § 1988 and subsequent interpretation by the courts
create the presumption of awarding fees to a prevailing plaintiff.216 This
presumption does not apply to a prevailing defendant.21 7 While § 1988 is at
times imperfectly applied, most courts do correctly apply the presumption as
intended by Congress.21 s Unfortunately, the same predictability has not de-
veloped with regard to section 502(g)(1) under the Eaves test.21 9
Courts have applied some form of the Johnson twelve-factor test to
§ 1988, section 502(g)(1) and § 626(b) to determine the "reasonable"
amount of attorney's fees to be awarded.2 2 ° In most cases, courts apply a
211. Courts have consistently held that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees.
See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (awarding attorney's fees under
§ 1988, for work on all claims to plaintiff who prevailed on some but not all claims); Jardien v.
Winston Network, Inc., 888 F.2d 1151, 1159 (7th Cir. 1989) (awarding prevailing discharged
employee costs and fees in ADEA action); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d
834, 842 (3d Cir. 1977) (awarding attorney's fees where prevailing plaintiff charged age dis-
crimination by employer), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Brennan v. Ace Hardware
Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1974) (awarding fees even where employer prevailed under
ADEA because Secretary filed action before properly attempting to achieve voluntary compli-
ance by employer as required by the statute). Attorneys who litigate under ADEA are assured
of fees if they prevail. Further, courts routinely include expert witness fees in the attorney's fee
award. The twelve factors are used to estimate how much the award will be, and to make and
support an argument before the court as to why the actual fee awarded should be what the
attorney has requested.
212. See generally KALET, supra note 201, at 111-16.
213. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (1988).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988).
215. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 1988; see also supra note 180 and accompanying text.
217. See 1976 SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 5912.
218. Id. at 5910.
219. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text. The test applied to § 502(g)(1)
awards is very similar and can be found in Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th
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lodestar test 2 21 and then use the twelve-factor test to determine if the lode-
star should be adjusted.22 2 While courts have made inconsistent awards
under § 1988 and section 502(g)(1), these same inconsistencies do not appear
to exist in ADEA cases.22 3
III. COMMENT: WHY PLAINTIFFS' ADVOCATES ARE CORRECT
The overwhelming weight of evidence suggests that the availability of
competent counsel depends on the regularity of fee awards to prevailing
plaintiffs. Though each of the circuits use virtually the same test, applying
some version of the Eaves test, there are often disparate results.2 24 Conse-
quently, plaintiffs' counsel are reluctant to bring ERISA actions, thus
preventing rather than encouraging plaintiffs of modest means to bring such
actions.
Industry participants argue that the current discretionary standard for
award of attorney's fees furthers the purpose of ERISA without inviting un-
meritorious lawsuits. 2 25 Given the expense and time involved in litigating an
ERISA action, this concern has some validity. In particular, where such
litigation is funded by the plan, all participants and beneficiaries of the plan
are potential losers. Nonetheless, under the Eaves test courts may award
Cir. 1975) (requiring court to consider twelve-factor Johnson test when making fee award),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976).
221. See McDaniel v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 6 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA)
2700 (W.D. Wash. 1985) (employing the lodestar test in a § 502(g)(1) case), rev'd, 817 F.2d
1370 (9th Cir. 1987); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying the lodestar
test in a § 626(b) case), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978); City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying the lodestar test in a § 1988 case), appeal after remand,
560 F.2d 1093 (2d Cir. 1977); see also supra notes 188-194 and accompanying text.
222. See e.g., Lawson v. Lapeka, Inc., 55 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 987 (D. Kan. 1991)
(awarding attorney's fees, in an ADEA case, to the prevailing plaintiff using the Johnson
twelve-factor test); Van Fossan v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 710 Pension Fund,
649 F.2d 1243, 1249 (7th Cir. 1981) (approving the use, in an ERISA case, of the Johnson
twelve-factor test by the district court to determine the amount of attorney's fees to be
awarded to the prevailing plaintiff).
223. This clarity can be attributed to automatic awards of fees to a prevailing plaintiff and
the use of a general lodestar calculation. See Rogers v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d
834, 842 (3d Cir. 1977) (awarding attorney's fees in ADEA suits where the employee prevails
against former employer for age discrimination), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978); Brennan
v. Ace Hardware Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that if a judgment is
entered for a plaintiff in an ADEA case, attorney's fees and costs are recoverable). The twelve
factors are generally only considered to determine whether or not to adjust the lodestar
amount. See, e.g., Drez v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 1432, 1446 (D. Kan. 1987)
(holding that an employee who was a prevailing party in an ADEA action against his em-
ployer is entitled to costs and attorney's fees based on the twelve factors). It appears that
under § 1988, these factors are sometimes considered concurrently with the consideration of
whether fees are to be awarded at all.
224. See supra note 67.
225. See supra notes 127-43 and accompanying text.
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fees to either party.2 26 Therefore, the plan is afforded some protection by
judicial flexibility to award fees to a prevailing defendant, mitigating a plain-
tiff's unmeritorious or frivolous claims.22 7
As industry points out, in reality, most circuits rarely award attorney's
fees to a prevailing defendant.2 28 In cases where courts award such fees, the
reasons most often cited are bad faith and frivolous claims.229 Industry ig-
nores, however, that attorney's fee awards are also available through Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 230 Rule 11 sanctions protect parties
in any litigation from incurring expenses defending unmeritorious or frivo-
lous claims. Moreover, Rule 11 sanctions are quite common.23 ' Thus the
application of Rule 11 in ERISA cases should limit unmeritorious or frivo-
lous claims and render similar standards repetitious and unnecessary.23 2
Similarly, mandatory fee awards may also effectively control unwarranted
claims.
If ERISA were rewritten to include a provision that mandatorily awards
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff, the plaintiff would be forced to win
the case in order to collect attorney's fees from the defendant.23 3 This re-
226. Eaves v. Penn, 587 F.2d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1978).
227. See, e.g., Vintilla v. United States Steel Corp. Plan for Employee Pension Benefits, 642
F. Supp. 295, 297 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (prevailing defendant-employer entitled to attorney's fees in
an ERISA action where controlling precedent was clearly against plaintiff's claim and action
was an attempt to receive the same benefits twice), aff'd, 815 F.2d 693 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 847 (1987). The theory behind such an award is that it will discourage other poten-
tial plaintiffs from bringing such a claim.
228. Bertino, supra note 91.
229. See Vintilla, 642 F. Supp. at 297; Baker v. Greater Kan. City Laborers Welfare Fund,
716 F. Supp. 1229, 1230 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (awarding attorney fees to fund because employee
pursued meritless claim).
230. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. In pertinent part the Rule states:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
Id.
231. See FEDERAL PROCEDURE CoMMITrEE, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, Rule 11 and Other
Power (ABA 1986) (discussing Rule I 1 sanctions by Circuit and showing that Rule 11 sanc-
tions against trial lawyers and their clients are being ordered with increasing frequency).
232. Rule 11 is already being used with increasing frequency in ERISA cases. Courts also
use FED. R. App. P. 38 to impose sanctions for frivolous appeals. See, e.g., Tomczyk v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United, No. 91-1018, 1991 U.S. App LEXIS 30199, at *22, *25 (7th Cir.
Dec. 30, 1991) (sanctioning plaintiff's attorney for pursuing a frivolous appeal and misleading
the court); Baxter v. C.A. Muer Corp., 941 F.2d 451, 456 (6th Cir. 1991) (imposing double
costs against the plaintiff on the finding that plaintiff's appeal of Rule 11 sanctions was
frivolous).
233. See infra notes 244-45 and accompanying text (suggesting possible language for re-
quiring the mandatory award of attorney's fees in benefit cases).
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quirement would sufficiently deter a plaintiff from bringing an unmeritorious
or frivolous claim. 234 Because most plaintiffs cannot pay such fee awards,
the attorney would have to absorb the loss if sanctions were imposed. The
discretion of legal practitioners would act as a safety net for the interests of
plans and industry.235 Rather than increasing the amount of litigation, the
mandatory award of attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs in benefit cases
may well decrease the amount of litigation over such claims.2 36
While the adoption of a prevailing plaintiff standard would strengthen the
enforcement rights of participants and beneficiaries, a mandatory standard
similar to § 626(b) would more efficiently ensure that the statute would be
self-enforced.237 Such a standard provides clear incentive for attorneys to
develop an expertise in the area of law covered by the ADEA and to take
plaintiffs' cases."' Finally, discretion concerning the amount of fees to be
awarded should be left to the trial judge, who can best determine the exper-
tise of counsel, the appropriate hourly rate, and other mitigating factors.239
The inconsistently applied Eaves test, advocated by industry, is not the
proper standard to be applied by the courts. Rather, the experiences of those
representing the participants and beneficiaries of plans covered under ER-
ISA demonstrate the need for change.2 ° Specifically, groups such as the
NSCLC, AARP, and the PRC can provide much-needed guidance in re-
shaping ERISA to fulfill its legislative purpose.24 1 Further, the barriers to
234. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Any practicing attorney facing Rule 11 sanctions would
think twice before bringing an expensive ERISA action.
235. See Eisenberg Testimony, supra note 150, at 1.
236. If a plan administrator knows that a plaintiff who prevails in a benefit denial case will
receive fees, he or she would no doubt be extremely careful in reviewing the claim for benefits.
Further, because a mandatory fee standard would require that a participant prevail in order to
recover such fees, a participant would not likely bring an action under section 502 unless the
participant was relatively sure that the benefit was incorrect.
237. See supra notes 202-12 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., Greene v. Whirlpool Corp., 538 F. Supp. 352, 356 (W.D.N.C. 1982) (holding
that plaintiff who prevailed in an ADEA action against employer for age discrimination is
entitled to attorney's fees based on Johnson test), rev'd on other grounds, 708 F.2d 128 (4th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984).
239. See, e.g., Lightfoot v. Walker, 826 F.2d 516, 519-20, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1987) (awarding
fees to attorneys who prevailed in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case under § 1988, where awards were
based on both the current market rate for attorneys with counsel's expertise and the general
lodestar test); Lynch v. Milwaukee, 747 F.2d 423, 426 (7th Cir. 1984) (awarding attorney who
prevailed in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases fees based on general lodestar test, and explaining that the
twelve factors may be considered when determining a § 1988 award of attorney's fees).
240. See supra notes 144-66 and accompanying text. The disparity in circuit court deci-
sions shows the need for a clear standard to determine the award of attorney's fees in ERISA
benefits cases.
241. AARP, the NSCLC and the PRC are all non-profit groups that serve the public.
Specifically, AARP represents over thirty-three million members over the age of 55; the
NSCLC, since its inception in the early 1970s, has helped workers and retirees obtain their
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effective ERISA practice, identified by attorneys who are currently repre-
senting ERISA participants and beneficiaries, reflect the magnitude of the
problem. The result should lead to a mandatory award of attorney's fees to
prevailing plaintiffs as intended by ERISA.
In order to adequately protect plan participants under ERISA, Congress
should amend section 502(g)(1) so that attorney's fees are mandatorily
awarded to a prevailing plaintiff. This will enable participants to bring legiti-
mate actions under ERISA, while discouraging frivolous or unmeritorious
suits. Also, courts will then be able to apply section 502(g)(1) consistently,
eliminating the vast inconsistencies that currently exist.24 2 Finally,
mandatory fee awards will encourage attorneys to develop expertise in this
complex and sparsely represented area. Through adoption of this provision,
Congress would provide the means by which the ultimate policy of ERISA,
that of protecting participants, could be served.243
Presuming that section 502(g)(1) needs to be amended by Congress, such
an amendment should be clear on its face-reflecting the explicit legislative
history. A workable provision that would fulfill ERISA's intent, enabling
participant's to enforce their rights under the Act, could read as follows:
In any action or administrative proceeding commenced pursuant
to section 502(g)(2), the court or agency shall award the prevailing
plaintiff or plaintiffs, other than the United States, a reasonable at-
torney's fee, including expert witness fees and litigation expenses
and costs to be paid by the defendant. A prevailing defendant shall
be entitled to costs where the court finds a clear showing that the
action was commenced by the plaintiff or plaintiffs in bad faith
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
The legislative history to such an amendment should specifically articulate
the meaning of a "reasonable" attorney's fee. The lodestar test adopted by
pension benefits through both litigation and technical support; the PRC assists the public
through a technical assistance hotline and through its national network of pension attorneys.
Each of these groups has regular contact with the people that ERISA was designed to pro-
tect-the participants and beneficiaries. Due to the unique individual interaction that each of
these groups has with participants and beneficiaries, their observations and experiences deserve
close attention and consideration. See supra notes 144-66 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 67.
243. Section 2(b) of Title I of ERISA states:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect interstate commerce
and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries, by
requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial
and other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by provid-
ing for the appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1988).
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the Supreme Court2 4 and a modified twelve-factor test24 should be suffi-
cient to define the term "reasonable." As stated above, the trial judge's dis-
cretionary standard should alleviate any inconsistent application, assuming
the factors to be considered are fully explained in the legislative history.
ERISA, similar to the ADEA standard, should also allow for expert wit-
ness fees. 246 The 1990 DOL proposal to change ERISA included a provision
to clarify that expert witness fees may be awarded under ERISA in fiduciary
cases, but did not provide for recapturing witness fees in benefits cases.24 7 In
a study of over 600 ERISA cases conducted by the Pension Rights Center
during the summer of 1990, not a single case specified that an award of
expert witness fees had been made.248 NPAP lawyers who practice in the
ERISA area have indicated that the costs of expert witness fees are ordina-
rily not included in attorney's fee awards, however, they often can persuade
the opposing party to agree to such fees when settling an ERISA case.24 9
Because ERISA benefit denial cases are complex, an expert is frequently
needed to determine the actuarial value of the benefits that have been denied.
Given that the plaintiff is usually litigating a small pension benefit or health
claim, expecting the plaintiff to pay for expensive expert witness fees from
their own settlement is equivalent to denying the plaintiff access to the
courts.
To ensure fairness to prevailing plaintiffs, the legislative history of an
amended section 502 should provide for the awarding of attorney's fees to a
plaintiff who prevails on some, but not all, issues. Even though, under both
§ 1988 and § 626(b), it is unnecessary to prevail on all issues in order to be
awarded attorney's fees,2 5 ° partial success is often grounds for denial of all
244. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983); see also supra notes 188-94 and
accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text.
246. Although there is no specific language in ADEA requiring the award of expert witness
fees, they are routinely included in an attorney's fees award. See Heiar v. Crawford County,
746 F.2d 1190, 1203 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that policemen prevailing in action under
ADEA, charging that mandatory retirement at fifty-five violated statute, must be awarded
attorney's fees and expert witness fees), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); McNeil v. Econom-
ics Lab., Inc., 800 F.2d 111, 113 (7th Cir. 1986) (awarding an employee who prevailed in an
ADEA suit against his employer attorney's fees and costs), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
247. See DOL Letter, supra note 108, at 1.
248. Ann Bertino, Fiduciary Case Study (Summer 1990) (on file at Pension Rights Center).
If the courts were including such fees, they were not elaborating on this fact in their opinions.
249. See Phone Survey, supra note 106.
250. Cancellier v. Federated Dep't Stores, 672 F.2d 1312, 1320 (9th Cir.) (awarding fees
although plaintiff did not prevail on reinstatement action for age discrimination, based on the
successful defense of the verdict below), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 859 (1982). However, the
Supreme Court has ruled that degree of success is a critical factor in determining the amount
of an attorney's fee award. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) (awarding
plaintiff attorney's fees when the plaintiff prevails on some claims in a § 1983 action).
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attorney's fees in section 502(g)(1) ERISA actions. 251' The amended legisla-
tion should award attorney's fees for all time spent pursuing ERISA claims,
as long as a participant prevails on at least one major issue covered under
ERISA and all other issues were litigated in good faith. Rule 11 sanctions
would protect defendants and assure that frivolous and unmeritorious claims
are not rewarded.2 52
For the mandatory award statute to be completely effective, amended sec-
tion 502(g)(1) should provide for the award of attorney's fees for administra-
tive proceedings commenced on behalf of the plaintiff. Currently, it is often
necessary to elicit the assistance of a lawyer simply to exhaust the internal
plan remedies.2 53 Moreover, where the attorney and participant successfully
resolve the conflict at this stage, the attorney cannot go to court to seek fees
for his services.2 54 The Pension Rights Center, as well as several govern-
ment agencies including the DOL, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corpora-
tion (PBGC), and the IRS, are attempting to develop an administrative
proceeding for benefit denials that follow internal plan proceedings and pre-
cede federal court actions.2 55 If such an alternative dispute mechanism be-
comes a reality, language in section 502(g)(1) must provide for attorney's
fees at the administrative level.
In the recent Supreme Court decision of Evan v. Jeff D. ,56 the Court held
that defendants may request a waiver of attorney's fees as part of a settle-
ment.2 57 This waiver of attorney's fees is another pressing problem that
needs to be addressed by an amended section 502(g)(1). The Supreme Court
in Evan, held that a benefit claims case defendant could settle with the plain-
251. See Voliva v. Seafarer's Pension Plan, 858 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that
employee who brought an ERISA action for denial of benefits and who prevailed on one but
not all issues at trial was not entitled to attorney's fees); see also Phone Survey, supra note 106
(noting that an attorney from the Third Circuit stated that this issue was his foremost barrier
to recovery of attorney's fees).
252. See supra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 148. ERISA is so complex that many attorney's hesitate to learn the
statute. It is unrealistic to expect that the average lay person could enforce his or her rights
under ERISA without assistance.
254. Section 502(a) states than an action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary, a
fiduciary, or the Secretary. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988). No provision of ERISA allows an
attorney to bring an action to recover fees incurred for action at the administrative level.
255. Meeting held at the Pension Rights Center, Fall 1990, attended by representatives
from the IRS, DOL, PBGC and several plaintiffs' advocates, including the Pension Rights
Center, the National Senior Citizens Law Center and the Older Womens Network. The par-
ties in attendance discussed creating an interagency program to aid participants and benefi-
ciaries who need assistance.




tiff for full benefits conditioned on a waiver of all attorney's fees.25 8 Thus,
the defendant "for all intents and purposes [admits to] liability with no con-
sequences., 25 9 Such an offer is nearly impossible for the participant to turn
down, leaving the attorney without payment as most "client[s] [cannot] af-
ford to pay and the pension cannot be attached. ,2 ' This is a dangerous
loophole ripe for abuse.2 6' Such waivers deny benefits at no cost to the
plan.262 For this reason, the legislative history should specifically state that
a plaintiff who prevails at any level will be entitled to attorney's fees and that
waivers are improper because they fail to protect the attorney's interest in
the case.
All of the above suggested amendments encompass the stated purpose of
ERISA.26 3 Such changes are both timely and necessary in order to assure
that ERISA will operate as a protective statute that can readily enforce the
very rights it was designed to protect. Without such changes, participants
remain almost powerless to enforce their rights. The suggested amendment
may have the incidental effect of causing plan administrators to be more
careful in reviewing benefits claims, which could in turn reduce the need for
attorney intervention.
IV. CONCLUSION
To improve the system of attorney's fee awards for prevailing plaintiffs in
ERISA benefits actions, the application of section 502(g)(1) must be recon-
ciled with the sparse legislative history of the statute. Failure to unify the
disparate standards which currently exist contravenes ERISA's intent.
The omission by ERISA's drafters of a provision requiring the mandatory
award of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff has worked to the detriment
of those the statute was intended to protect. The ambiguities of section
502(g)(1) and the silence of the legislative history have fostered inconsistent
awards of attorney's fees. Not only is such inconsistency inappropriate for a
federal statue, but it also discourages attorneys from litigating ERISA bene-
fit claims. Without representation, participants are often powerless to en-
force their ERISA rights. Industry concerns are easily allayed through Rule
258. Id. at 730 (holding that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, neither the statute nor the legislative
history suggests that Congress intended to forbid all fee waivers).
259. David Preminger, Statement before The Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration
Advisory Council on Employee Welfare & Pension Benefit Plans, August 20, 1990, at 4.
260. Id.
261. The Fund is in a position to force the plaintiff's hand. If the plaintiff does not take the
settlement with the waiver, he or she may not receive any benefits at all. This discourages
attorneys from getting involved, because rarely is the settlement award such that the plaintiff
can pay the attorney's fee.
262. Id.
263. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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11 protective sanctions and the requirement that the participant must pre-
vail, at some level, in order to recover attorney's fees.
It was never intended that the DOL be the sole enforcer of ERISA.
Rather, the DOL hoped that those whose rights were protected under the
statute would enforce it. In order to make this vision a reality, section
502(g)(1) must be amended to require a mandatory award of attorney's fees
for prevailing plaintiffs, attorney's fees for administrative proceedings, expert
witness fees, and costs. Otherwise, section 502(g)(1) is but a token gesture to
the millions of participants who are rendered powerless to enforce its
protection.
Ann C. Bertino
